As the size and intensity of aquaculture enterprises increase in this millennium, so will the scale for potential loss from disease. Economies dependent on them for export earnings will be vulnerable to disastrous epizootics that must be avoided by implementation of appropriate safeguards. These should be based on a scientific determination of disease transfer risks and be designed to have minimum impact on international trade. The risk assessment process outlined by the WTO SPS agreement exemplifies this approach. We will illustrate the issues on preventing the spread of fish and shellfish diseases based on our experience with two shrimp viruses (IHHNV and WSSV). The greatest risk for disease spread lies with careless movement of living animals for aquaculture. Other risks will also be reviewed. Ultimately, inten sive aquaculture will move towards closed recycle systems based on domesticated and genetically im proved stocks. The impetus for this will come mostly as a result of pressure from national trade require ments concerning human and veterinary health risks, and from consumer groups concerned about the environment and animal welfare.
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As the size and intensity of aquaculture enterprises in crease, so will the scale for potential loss from disease. Economies dependent on aquaculture for export earn ings will be vulnerable to disastrous epizootics such as the staggering lost production due to white spot syndrome virus (WSSV) in Asia since 19932) and in Latin America since 1999. It will be increasingly important to avoid disease outbreaks by implementation of "appropriate safeguards" based on scientific determination of disease transfer risks and designed to have a minimum impact on international trade. The risk assessment process out lined by the World Trade Organization Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS agreement) exemplifies this approach.
We contend that the greatest risk for spread of diseases lies by far with the careless, cross-boundary movement of living animals or fry destined directly for aquaculture facilities. There have been many examples of exotic spe cies introductions according to the Food and Agricul tural Organization statistics summarized in Table 1 . This shows that about 65% of exotic species introductions have been intentional, and that 69% of these (39% of the total) have been for aquaculture. The vast majority of introduced species (82%) have been finfish (Table  2) , followed distantly by mollusks (9%) and crustaceans (6%). All would have the potential to carry pathogens. In our view, the most ominous would be viral and para sitic diseases that would otherwise have very little chance of being introduced. Because we are shrimp specialists, most of the examples given here will be for shrimp. However, the concepts and principles discussed could be equally applied to fish, mollusks and other aquatic species. We will focus on two shrimp viruses as recent examples of pathogens in troduced with living shrimp for aquaculture, but other risks will also be reviewed. The strategy is to reduce these importation risks while also strengthening internal programs for direct disease control, including surveil lance and (when appropriate) treatment, vaccination and confinement of outbreaks. In our opinion, intensive aquacuiture operations will inexorably move towards closed recycle systems or otherwise bio-secure systems based on the cultivation of domesticated and genetically improved stocks. The impetus for this will come mostly as a result of pressure from international trade require ments concerning human health and import risks, and from consumer groups concerned about the environment and animal welfare.
INFECTIOUS HYPODERMAL AND HEMATO POIETIC NECROSIS VIRUS (IHHNV)
IHHNV was first discovered in the blue shrimp Penaeus stylirostris and white shrimp P vannamei in the Ameri cas in the early 1980's3,4) where it is believed to have been introduced by importation of live experimental stocks of black tiger shrimp Penaeus monodon from Asia5). Work on this virus has been reviewed on several occasions6,7). IHHNV has been reported in several spe cies of wild and cultured penaeid shrimp throughout the world7), but causes acute epizootics and mass mortality only in P stylirostris . By contrast, it causes reduced growth and deformities in P vannamei. Shrimp that sur vive IHHNV epizootics may carry the virus for life and pass it on by vertical and horizontal transmission7). In fected adults seldom show signs of the disease or mor talities8). P monodon appears to be relatively unaffected by IHHNV while Penaeus indicus and Penaeus merguiensis appear to be refractory to infection 6. 1, 9) .
It is important to realize that IHHNV was unknown be fore it jumped from exotic P, monodon to American P stylirostris and P. vannamei. We now know that IHHNV is endemic and prevalent in Asian P monodon where it rarely harms its host. Indeed, highly sensitive polymerase chain reaction (PCR) assays may be required to detect its presence10). This is the type of scenario that poses the most serious disease threat to present and future aquac ulture operations: i.e., a relatively innocuous (and pos sibly unknown) endemic pathogen (particularly viral) is moved together with a living aquatic animal over a large geographical distance to a new location where the local aquaculture species (or even local varieties of the im port species) may be much more severely affected. Crus taceans may be particularly problematic because of their apparent propensity to have persistent, single to mul tiple viral infections without gross or even histological signs of disease10). As far as we know, the total lost pro duction from retarded growth and mortality due to IHHNV has not been estimated, but it must be substan tial when taken over the whole shrimp aquaculture in dustry in the Americas since the early 1980's. Some in dication of its impact can however be gained from work carried out with stocks of shrimp bred specifically to be free of IHHNV infection. In an intensive system in Ha waii, removal of IHHNV related "runting" increased crop value by 162% over infected stock11).
WHITE SPOT SYNDROME VIRUS (WSSV)
Although WSSV initially caused serious shrimp produc tion losses in Asia only2), it must now be considered the single most serious shrimp pathogen worldwide. It was first reported from farmed Penaeus japonicus in Japan in 199312-16) and called penaeid rod-shaped DNA virus (PRDV) or rod-shaped nuclear virus of P. japonicus (RV pJ)12,13,15,17,18) Similar rod-shaped viruses from elsewhere in Asia were called by various names5) but Lightner7) grouped them in a single white spot syndrome virus (WSSV) complex. WSSV is now considered to repre sent a new virus family19) tentatively called Whispoviridae or Nimaviridae20). Captured broodstock and postlarvae used to stock rearing ponds are known to carry WSSV, as are numerous other crustaceans and perhaps even aquatic insect larvae, but massive mortal ity usually occurs with juvenile shrimp in rearing ponds, probably precipitated by environmental factors10).
In Thailand, outbreaks of WSSV in shrimp culture ponds initially occurred in 19941 1,22) and caused a peak esti mated lost production of 70,000 metric tons in 1996. The total, cumulative lost production for all Asian coun tries since 1993 must now amount to several hundred thousand tons. However, losses were later reported from the USA23), Central America and South America and molecular biological techniques have shown that WSSV from these outbreaks is identical or closely related to that in Asia22-28). Thus, by 2001 the cumulative global loss to WSSV must be in the order of I million metric tons or more.
The WSSV outbreaks in Japan were the first widely re ported, but they actually followed Chinese outbreaks and apparently resulted from the import of living post larvae from China directly to aquaculture facilities in Japan 14) . We find it curious that WSSV had not been reported from China prior to the catastrophic disease outbreaks in 1993, in spite of the fact that shrimp aquaculture had been practiced there for many years. The nature of the outbreaks was reminiscent of the initial IHHNV out breaks for P stylirostris in the Americas, suggesting that they may have originated from importation of a distant, exotic aquaculture species carrying a previously un known pathogen. Although a possible link has never been investigated, it is interesting that red claw (Cherax quadricarinatus), an Australian freshwater crayfish, had been imported into China for aquaculture in the imme diate period before the outbreaks. The possibility that it may have been the original source of WSSV in China should be investigated. Evidence from Ecuador may sup port this possibility. We have discovered and confirmed by in situ hybridization the presence of WSSV in archived slides and paraffin blocks of diseased P. vannamei from Eduador from 1996 (Flegel and Alday de Graindorge, unpublished). Thus, it was actually present three years before the widespread WSSV epi zootics in 1999 and approximately two years after the importation of Australian red claw for aquaculture in 1994. In addition, 10 healthy red claw specimens from 3 Ecuadorian freshwater areas, remote from the sea, tested positive for WSSV by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) assay in 2000 (Alday de Graindorge, unpublished). Al though WSSV can be lethal in experimental red claw infections31), our field data from Ecuador suggest that it may carry the virus at low levels without gross signs of disease.
OTHER SHRIMP VIRUSES
Yellow-head virus was first reported from Thailand in 199032), although the causative agent was not identified until two years later33,34). Viruses closely related to YHV have been reported from P monodon in Australia 35,36), where they have been named gill associated virus (GAV) and lymphoid organ virus (LOV). YHV is a rod shaped, enveloped, positive sense, ssRNA virus, probably be longing to a new family allied to the Coronaviridae37,38). It is capable of infecting several penaeid species, includ ing those from the western hemisphere23,39). It can also infect planktonic shrimp species that are common resi dents of shrimp ponds as grossly normal carriers (e.g., Palaemon styliferus and Acetes sp.).
YHV caused serious losses in Thai production in the early 1990's but has been overshadowed by WSSV since 1994. Although severe YHV outbreaks have declined in frequency since the early 1990's, they still do occur and cause significant production losses. In spite of this, the virus is has not spread as widely as WSSV, judging from the low frequency of reports from other countries in Asia and from the Americas 11,40).
Taura syndrome (TS) was first described as a shrimp disease in Ecuador in 199241) and later found to be caused by a virus named Taura Syndrome virus or TSV42,43). It is a cytoplasmic, non-enveloped, icosahedral, positive sense ssRNA virus and tentatively classified as a picor navirus44,45). TSV was a serious cause of shrimp mortal ity for reared P vannamei in the Americas where it spread principally through regional and international transfer of live postlarvae and broodstock. More recently, it was reported from P vannamei reared in Taiwan after importation of live shrimp stocks from the Americas46). Although TSV infects a number of penaeid species'), it has caused serious commercial losses only for juvenile to adult stages of P. vannamei.
RISK ASSESSMENT
As with the international spread of disease for other aquaculture species, IHHNV, WSSV and other shrimp viruses appear to have spread mainly through the move ment of infected broodstock and fry (postlarvae). How ever, other possible routes of disease introduction need to be considered. These include importation of green fro zen shrimp, processed shrimp, shrimp head-meal, and crustaceans in released ballast water.
Import of live animals
Growing perception of environmental and disease threats has led to increased interest in uniform standards for importation of all living marine animals and plants. (b) All effluents from quarantine facilities would be ster ilized in an approved manner, killing all living organ isms.
(c) If evidence of disease was obtained during the quar antine period, the introduced animals and their offspring would be destroyed immediately and the facility ster ilized.
Given the experience with IHHNV in P monodon, it would seem prudent to add to clause (a) the requirement that local species of shrimp , and especially economically important ones, be included as co-habitants in the quar antine phase. This would guard against the unintentional transfer of any well-tolerated , unknown pathogen from the exotic host to local species that might be more vul nerable and more seriously affected . Doing this would have avoided the release of IHHNV in the Americas , WSSV in Japan and TSV in Taiwan. However, to make the guidelines work , standard protocols for inspection, disease diagnosis, and certification of shipments of live marine animals are required and the infrastructure for this is not always in place . More than anything, increased awareness of the threats among aquaculture practitio ners is needed.
In addition to the ICES code, signatories to the GATT and WTO are bound by the Agreement On The Appli cation of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the "SPS Agreement"). The SPS Agreement applies to all sani tary and phytosanitary measures which may, directly or indirectly, affect international trade, including trade in live organisms. It permits sanitary and phytosanitary measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, but only if they are based on scientific principles. They cannot be maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, and must not arbitrarily or unjustifi ably discriminate between members where identical or similar conditions prevail. In particular, it states that measures cannot be applied in a manner that would con stitute a disguised restriction on international trade.
The risk of introducing exotic pathogens can be reduced significantly by using specific pathogen-free (SPF) stocks. However, in addition to possible deficiencies in SPF technology, other disease problems may develop from unknown pathogens in the imported populations. SPF stocks may also vary in the specific pathogens for which they are designated "free", so the excluded patho gens must be clearly identified.
Another approach with viral diseases is to develop re sistant shrimp strains or to use shrimp species that are "specific pathogen resistant" (SPR) , regardless of their pathogen status. However, "resistant" shrimp may some times carry the relevant virus as a persistent infection and be capable of introducing it to naive populations. Even if a virus of the same name is already present in a native population, new strains may be introduced with SPR stocks and their prevalence might be maintained or increased. In addition, stress during farming can trigger increased viral replication in shrimp, resulting in dis ease outbreaks. There is also a danger that an exotic virus could mutate into a more pathogenic strain. This is particularly important for TSV and YHV, since RNA viruses are known to mutate and evolve rapidly"'. Even with SPF or SPR shrimp, first importation should in volve co-habitation tests with local species and variet ies to guard against introduction of unknown pathogens.
Fortunately, excellent diagnostic probes are available for all of the major shrimp pathogens49) and they can be ap plied for screening broodstock and fry before importa tion and stocking. For example, PCR screening of shrimp postlarvae before stocking is now a routine practice for many Asian shrimp farmers, and it has been credited with reducing the risk of WSSV outbreakssosu. As a cor ollary, the risk of introducing IHHNV, WSSV and other viruses with unscreened, living, captured animals or their fry from infected areas is extremely high. Import of processed shrimp Importation of cooked, dried and salted shrimp pose no threat of pathogen introduction, as the conditions used in their processing regime would inactivate the viruses.
Import of green shrimp
Green shrimp are fresh/frozen raw shrimp. Careful as sessment shows that the possible risks from green shrimp vary greatly with product target use and the likelihood that viable viral particles present in frozen carcasses will reach a susceptible host. Pathogen viability can be af fected by factors such as processing time, freezing and thawing after processing. The usage pattern and disease risks for various types of green shrimp are shown in Fig.  1 and discussed in the following paragraphs.
Before proceeding, however, we would like to caution against the use of PCR analysis to detect virus infection in commodity shrimp (i.e., processed or frozen shrimp). PCR is a very sensitive method for the detection of patho gens. However, it is based on detection of relatively small nucleic acid fragments and so can give positive results with non-viable viral particles or even degraded DNA (i.e., un-infectious material). Due to the high risk of dis ease transfer associated with living stocks destined for aquaculture, it is generally accepted as a valid test for screening live animals (OIE, Diagnostic Manual for Aquatic Animal Diseases), and we can accept that some rejected animals will be assay positive but un-infectious. However, PCR assays and even bioassays to evaluate the disease status of frozen shrimp carcasses destined for human consumption is, in our view, inappropriate since the relative risk of disease transfer from this source is likely to be low, as described in the following para graphs.
Green shrimp for bait Green bait shrimp are generally inexpensive and small (under 10-15g) and may be a potential route for dis semination of shrimp pathogens. Meyers52) has suggested that the European strain of virulent viral haemorrhagic septicaemia virus (VHSV) arose through the habit of feeding frozen bait to hatchery fish, and laboratory ex periments have shown that frozen, Asian shrimp from supermarkets can result in WSSV disease when thawed and fed directly to test shrimp in an aquarium 3053 Even if an infection was by chance successfully achieved by this route, we would have to consider that the infec tion would have to become established and that only a portion of the infected animals could potentially lead to permanent establishment of the pathogen in the local environment. Further transmission from the environment to aquaculture facilities would reduce the probability still further. Although many of the proportions given are guesses, a recent publication has shown that the infec tion coefficient from highly viremic whole shrimp in an aquarium is 0.656) (i.e., of every 100 exposures, only 60 result in infection). In spite of our belief that there is low risk from recreational fishing bait, we do however, sup port the Australian Quarantine Inspection Service (AQIS) recommendation (Prawn product import risk analysis: technical issues paper, Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service, Canberra) that it be further re duced by a ban on the import of green bait shrimp origi nating from WSSV endemic areas. This belief is based on a consideration of the ease of implementation, the potential impact of the disease on Australian farmers, and equally importantly the relatively minor impact on international trade in this commodity.
It has also been recommended that the practice of feed ing shrimp broodstock with green shrimp and other crus taceans be discontinued in Taiwan and in Thailand24,54) because of the risk of transferring WSSV and other vi ruses. This is true whether the feeds used are local or imported. Indeed, the practice of feeding raw crustaceans should be completely discontinued in shrimp aquacul ture facilities given the potential risk of pathogen trans fer. We believe that the risk of viral transfer to shrimp aquac ulture via shrimp destined for human consumption is very low whether the shrimp are whole, head-off or de-veined . Any perceivable risk can be easily eliminated by imple mentation of simple risk reduction procedures, such as those outlined in the previous section. Our contention is based on the fact that green shrimp have been traded globally in the order of one million metric tons per year without any proven link to the transfer of disease to aquaculture. For example, IHHNV is endemic and highly prevalent in Asian P. monodon, yet the virus did not cause difficulties in the Americas until imported with living stocks for aquaculture. In another example, Japan has a resident shrimp aquaculture industry for P. japonicus. It is also one of the world's biggest per capita importers of shrimp with a good portion of this being frozen shrimp from Southeast Asia. In addition to frozen shrimp, Ja pan also imports live P. japonicus and P. monodon. From 1991 to 1998 during which time YHV was continuously reported, Japan imported 360,000 metric tons of fresh and frozen shrimp from Thailand alone. Approximately 1,000 metric tons was imported as live shrimp directly to the restaurant trade. There have been no reports of YHV outbreaks in Japan, in spite of this very large quan tity, the very small geographic area of Japan, the rela tive proximity of most food processing plants to the sea and the lack of any specific risk reduction measures. Similarly, the USA imported 326,000 tonnes of fresh and frozen shrimp from Thailand over the same period with no evidence of YHV transfer by this route. Even for WSSV, the "evidence" for transfer by this route re mains highly circumstantial and, given the volume of shrimp treated annually, outbreaks of the disease have been negligible in importing countries. There have also been no reports of YHV or WSSV transfer from Thai land to Australia, although the volume of imported shrimp (22,000 metric tonnes 1994-1998) was less than 1/10 of that to the USA and Japan.
Actual risks associated with the import of frozen shrimp for human consumption will depend upon the subsequent treatment of these products. Laboratory infection tests30,56) demonstrate that transmission by this route is theoreti cally possibile but the likelihood of disease through this route needs to be assessed based on the actual risks and probabilities involved as shown in Fig. 1 . It can be seen that there is little risk associated with standard import ing and marketing practices and end-use (cooking at home, for example). Indeed, given normal household and restaurant practice, it is difficult to imagine a route for viral transfer that would present any significant level of probable risk. Other risks arising from improper disposal of processing waste or product diverted for bait have already been considered.
As an example of risk calculation, shrimp exports from Thailand to Australia for 1997 and 1998 are shown in Table 3 . In both years the majority of shrimp were im ported as cooked product which carries no risk of trans fer of WSSV or any other virus. Of the frozen raw shrimp, most is peeled or head-off product which has a limited risk. The highest potential risk, from frozen raw head-on product represented 1.1% and 6.9% of total imports in 1997 and 1998 respectively. The risk associ ated with these imports is represented in Fig. 2 . Of the approximately 7% of shrimp which were imported as frozen raw head-on in 1998, most would probably have been subsequently cooked as either head-on or after de heading. The main risk would be with any infected, un cooked raw waste of which an unknown proportion may be disposed of in such a way as to bring it into contact with potential hosts during the time within which the virus remains infective.
In summary, there has been no known disease transfer from household or restaurant shrimp to aquaculture ponds or wild populations and we believe there is no reason to restrict trade in these products. This is in agreement with the AQIS prawn risk study for Australia (Draft prawn risk analysis, Australian Quarantine Inspection Service, Canberra, 2000).
Shrimp head meal and pelleted shrimp feed
Shrimp heads discharged from processing plants are often used for the production of shrimp head meal, a common ingredient in pelleted shrimp feeds. Even though these animals might have been infected with WSSV/YHV, the time-temperature regime used during head meal processing and feed manufacture would be sufficient to inactivate the virus. For example, some studies on viral inactivation have been carried out and some of these have been published58-62). A review of the head meal processing conditions and feed processing conditions revealed that the temperatures involved excluded the possibility of viral transfer by the feed route, and bioassay studies with WSSV in headmeal have confirmed this60-62) As a result, we are completely confident that these viruses cannot be transferred via the feed and it is accepted that shrimp headmeal inclusion in shrimp feed presents no reasonable risk of disease transfer. No experience from here or elsewhere has given any indication that this conclusion is invalid for IHHNV or TSV either. Given this risk, it is perhaps not surprising that WSSV first caused widespread outbreaks in Central America, including Panama, in early 1999. In April 1999, we as sisted in PCR testing of freshly captured broodstock shrimp at the Smithsonian Institute in Panama. The re sults showed 9/60 positive for WSSV (unpublished), suggesting that the virus had been established in the lo cal marine environment for a considerable period before the outbreaks. One possibility is that it was introduced there by Asian vessels approaching the Panama canal although this has been disputed on the basis that ballast discharge is not permitted in the canal zone. On the other hand, this does not discount the possibility of disease transmission through organisms fouling the hulls of ves sels.
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has es tablished some voluntary guidelines on ballast water handling although some of the suggested solutions are impractical from an operational viewpoint, being either prohibitively expensive or physically impossible. One option, the use of chemicals, would require approval by government agencies and could pose a threat to the ship crew and environment. However, judicious use of short lived insecticides might be effective in eliminating ar thropod carriers of WSSV and other diseases, reducing the probability of their transmission. Whatever method is adopted, introduction and accep tance of ballast water exchange methods can only buy time until better technologies and ship designs are avail able to reduce the risk of exotic species transfers. The Marine Environment Protection Committee is presently working on an annex to MARPOL (the IMO convention for the prevention of pollution from ships) to make the application of the guidelines mandatory. We believe that there is a real risk of introducing WSSV and other virus diseases through the discharge of ballast water in coastal areas but the degree of this risk is difficult to estimate since it depends upon a number of variable factors. Esti mations of risk associated with ballast water would have to be done on a case-by-case basis. However, manda tory ballast water exchange rules established for ves sels moving between specific regions may help to limit the problem.
CONCLUSIONS
The highest risk of introducing pathogens is through the import of live animals (broodstock and fry) from infected areas. Intentional movement of live animals should be restricted and carried out following ICES regulations . This should also be applied to SPF stocks and in par ticular to SPR stocks of shrimp , since we already know these are likely to be infected with the viruses they re sist. In addition , local initiatives can be taken such as the Asia Regional Guidelines for Responsible Movement of Live Aquatic Animals which are being formulated through a project of the Network of Aquaculture Cen ters in Asia Pacific (NACA), the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the Office Internationale des Epizooties (OIE) . These guidelines will form a basis for responsible and safe movement of live aquatic animals .
The degree of risk of introducing pathogens through fro zen food depends more on the possibility of viable viral particles contacting a new host, than on the viral load of the carcasses themselves. Therefore, frozen products used for bait and feeding live stocks, would be classified as high risk as they would be released into the environment or fed directly to susceptible hosts. Products imported for the processing industry, would represent a risk only when the waste was not properly disposed of and where there existed the possibility of mechanical transport of a sufficient dose of viable pathogen to susceptible hosts within the time during which the pathogen remained in fective. In our opinion, the possibility of this happening would represent a low risk. For similar reasons, we be lieve that frozen product imported for direct human con sumption represents an even lower risk. Processed shrimp and shrimp head meal would pose no threat as tempera ture and drying procedures would inactivate pathogens. The release of ballast waters into coastal areas and the presence of fouling organisms on ship hulls poses a threat difficult to assess, and needs further investigation, but to us seems to present a much bigger threat for disease transfer than that from imported shrimp for human con sumption due to the volumes of water and number of organisms involved. Although ballast water exchange as recommend by the IMO, is the most practical method so far suggested to reduce the disease transfer risk, we believe that the risks associated with ballast water and fouling organisms deserve further study. 
